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BU took out full page ads in the Boston Globe and Boston Herald on April 20, 2004, making ten claims about its proposed bioterrorism laboratory. How true are the claims? Here is a claim-by-claim review: BU claim #1: The National Biocontainment Laboratory is not a bioweapons facility, and bioweapons research is illegal. Truth: Bioweapons research is legal. To investigate vaccines and other defenses against bioweapons, scientists will experiment with bioweapons agents. The Biological Weapons Convention allows research on bioweapons agents for defensive purposes, but such research often has both offensive and defensive applications, blurring the line between allowable and prohibited work. Federally funded research on bioweapons is marred by a history of secrecy and misinformation, most strikingly in the hidden offensive biowarfare program carried out by the U.S. military from the late 1940s through the early 1970s. Since the Department of Defense (DoD) discontinued its disclosure policy on biological research in the early 1990s, there is growing concern about the potential for offensive research in U.S. labs. The DoD will have the right to fund research for BU's bioterrorism lab, which is being built with federal funds to research deadly disease causing agents that are or could be used in bioterrorism and biowarfare. Bioweapons agent research conducted in secret may be considered offensive research by other countries, perhaps leading to a bioweapons arms race. BU claim #2: Classified research is not planned for the bioterrorism lab and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) does not support classified research. Truth: BU policy allows classified research. NIAID policy allows classified research. NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci recently praised NIAID’s blossoming relationship with the Department of Defense, which supports classified research. NIAID’s own website admits that there may be classified research funded by NIAID during emergencies. In addition, other government agencies may fund classified research at the lab. Faculty at the University of California at Davis, who opposed their university’s application to NIAID for funding for a BSL4 lab, reviewed federal policy, spoke with NIH officials about the lab, and concluded that it is almost certain that classified research would be conducted at the lab. They wrote that, “the stated purpose and governance structure of the lab, the exigencies of operational funding, NIH’s planned collaboration with the Department of Defense, and our direct communication with NIH, all point to the likelihood of classified research.” BU claim #3: The facility will be similar to existing laboratories located on the BUMC campus. Truth: There are three other BSL4 laboratories in the United States, none in Boston, each sited in exurban or suburban locations, well removed from dense population centers. Unlike all the existing labs in Boston, the bioterrorism lab will perform research on deadly pathogens, including biowarfare agents, requiring the highest-level containment. It will have a security perimeter marked by high fencing, 24/7 lighting, and monitored by armed guards. It is not a public health facility; its main mission is research on biowarfare agents as identified by the federal government. BU claim #4: The Biosafety Level 4 suite comprises 13% of the site. Truth: There will be at least 12,000 gross square feet (gsf) of BSL4 laboratories, 15,000 gsf of BSL4 animal laboratories, and 6,000 gsf of BSL3/4 clinical space. BU's application to the federal government to build the lab explains that the lab is centered on the BSL4 component. BU claim #5: There has never been a community incident or accidental environmental release connected with a laboratory of this kind. Truth: There have been releases. In December 2003, a scientist in a BSL4 laboratory in Taiwan contracted SARS and left the laboratory while infected with the disease; many of the recent SARS outbreaks in Asia were caused by workers who were accidentally infected in the lab and transmitted the infections to others outside the lab; in 1979, in Sverdlovsk, USSR, an accidental aerosol release from a lab caused an anthrax epidemic and the deaths of 64 people in a 2.5 mile area downwind of the facility. Even Fort Detrick, where scientists are part of a long-standing culture that has worked with the deadliest pathogens, has recently been cited for safety lapses leading to the presence of anthrax outside the containment area. More examples are found elsewhere on this web site. BU claim #6: Sites similar to the laboratory are not known or likely terrorist targets. Truth: A biological weapons expert recently wrote, "The simplest, most likely path for a sub-state adversary, such as Al Qaeda, to acquire bioweapons capability is to obtain bioweapons agents and training by penetration of a biodefense research project in a U.S. laboratory." Terrorists might view the lab as a source of bioweapons materials or a facility to destroy. An attack on, or infiltration of, the lab could result in the release of pathogens or escape of infected laboratory animals, with deadly results. An attack on the lab that did not release pathogens might nonetheless cause damage in the nearby community. The lab requires extensive security because it houses deadly agents that can be used in biowarfare. BU claim #7: The laboratory will create approximately 660 jobs at all job classifications. Truth: BU has provided no documentation to support this claim. These jobs are not guaranteed for Boston residents, much less those in the South End/Roxbury neighborhoods. Significant barriers exist for obtaining these jobs, including advanced education requirements and FBI-level security clearance. In 2003, BU said that jobs for local residents would be janitorial and maintenance. The 1999 plan for the site included other types of labs, a hotel/conference center, and retail shops that would have provided more jobs and a greater variety of jobs than the bioterrorism lab. BU claim #8: The project will create 1300 construction jobs, with the goal of 50% created for Boston residents. Truth: BUMC has refused to provide documentation to support this claim, but has admitted that most of the construction jobs will be very short-term. Similarly sized bioresearch laboratories construction projects have required many fewer than 1,300 construction workers. NIH is building a similar BSL 3/4 lab with only 200 construction jobs. Most of the construction jobs will be very short-lived. The Boston Jobs Policy mandates 50% resident employment in construction, with 25% minority employment, and 10% female employment. The 1999 plan for the site would have required more construction jobs. BU claim #9: The biotechnology industry has contributed to 50% of all new industrial jobs over the past five years. Truth: The bioterrorism laboratory will NOT create industrial employment. The laboratory will be used for bioweapons agents research, not production. BU claim #10: BU is committed to community outreach and has held more than fifty meetings. Truth: BU has refused to meet with those who oppose the bioterrorism laboratory. It refused an invitation to participate in a February 28, 2004, informational hearing on its own campus and canceled its appearance at a Boston University student forum scheduled for April 12, 2004, purportedly due to the presence of a panelist opposed to the project. It refuses to provide written documentation to support its claims about the lab.
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